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Introduction 
 
I never thought that I would find inspiration for my thesis topic while doing 
something as mundane as grocery shopping, but as I was walking through the store 
reading all of the different labels claiming products were “all natural,” “eco-friendly,” 
“cruelty-free,” and “green,” I realized I had absolutely no idea what most of the labels 
actually meant. I try to be a responsible consumer, but I could not decide on the best way 
to choose between so many different products making so many different claims. There 
was just too much guesswork involved. I had a lot of questions about eco-labeling: When 
did all of this eco-labeling start? What do these labels even mean? Who is providing the 
labels? Who is regulating them? After spending a semester researching eco-labeling, I 
have discovered that the first question is the only one with a quick answer. The other 
answers are much more complicated.  
Eco-labeling started in 1978, when Germany introduced ‘Blue Angel,’ the first 
nationwide eco-labeling program. Since then there have been hundreds of eco-labeling 
schemes created all over the world by governments, NGOs, and companies. Some of the 
best-known labeling programs in the United States include the Forest Stewardship 
Council for wood products, Energy Star for appliances, and the Marine Stewardship 
Council for seafood (Stevens 2010).  
In theory, eco-labeling seems like an excellent way for producers and consumers 
to mutually benefit while reducing their environmental impacts. The idea is that eco-
labels allow manufacturers to advertise the reduced environmental impacts of their 
products, which may be difficult for shoppers to otherwise determine, giving them an 
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edge over the competition. The argument continues that by differentiating their products 
as environmentally superior, manufacturers will be able to charge a price premium. This 
price premium rewards producers with environmentally superior practices and 
encourages other companies to improve their practices so that they too can join the eco-
labeling market. In addition, producers may want to use eco-labels to avoid losing 
business to their competitors. As Boström and Klintman (2008: 29) note, “green labelling 
essentially relies on symbolic differentiation… The label says implicitly that this product 
is different from other products.” Eco-labeling allows manufacturers to distinguish their 
product from the average product.  
On the consumer side, eco-labels allow people to make more informed purchasing 
decisions that reflect their environmental values. When looking at a product, consumers 
have no way of knowing how it was produced or what inputs were required. Eco-labels 
are supposed to provide consumers with some of this missing environmental information. 
Consumers can ‘vote with their dollar’ to make consumption decisions that they feel 
good about. According to Koos (2011: 131):  
Product labels are informational devices that signal a specific quality of a 
product, which in most cases cannot be directly observed by the consumer. 
In doing so, environmental labels reduce the complexities surrounding the 
production and distribution of goods and transpose them into a 
dichotomous claim of meeting a standard or not. The underlying rationale 
in labelling is the governance of consumer behaviour through information 
provision.  
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Eco-labeling aims to influence consumer behavior by providing information. It is a 
unique policy tool because rather than being top-down, it is “a market-based and 
consumer-orientated approach to dealing with various environmental issues” (Boström 
and Klintman 2008: 28).  
As nice as eco-labeling sounds on paper, there are numerous practical problems 
associated with it. One of the largest problems is the abundance of vague and misleading 
environmental product claims. Ham and Forjan (2008: 297) argue:  
There is a proliferation of various labels, claims and additions to the name 
of the product like: “eco,” “bio,” “natural,” “organic,” recyclable,” etc. 
These kinds of claims are usually used arbitrarily and it is often unknown 
on which criteria they are based. Therefore they are frequently under 
criticism and attack by different interest groups.   
If eco-labels do not provide accurate information, but instead are based on arbitrary 
claims, they are more likely to confuse consumers than to help them make more informed 
decisions. Horne (2009: 180) raises similar complaints to Ham and Forjan during his 
discussion of eco-labels:  
The adoption of eco-labels is seen variously as an opportunity for 
increased sales through product differentiation, increased accountability, 
or increased choice for consumers in a greening retail environment. The 
reality often is too many products, too much information, too little time, 
and a paucity of independent, accessible, readily accessible and 
understandable information about environmental performance. 
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From personal shopping experience, I know that the ‘labeling-overload’ described in this 
quote can be stressful, which leads to ignoring the labels entirely. It is almost impossible 
to compare different eco-labels making different claims about different attributes of 
products to determine which one is ‘best’ for the environment. These quotes also 
emphasize that people are rightfully concerned about eco-labeling being used for 
greenwashing, or marketing deceptively to spin ordinary products as environmentally-
friendly for a profit. Adding prefixes that sound environmental onto various terms does 
not provide consumers with substantiated information or reduce the environmental 
impacts of production. Vague environmental claims just give products a superficial 
appearance of reduced environmental impacts.  
 In this thesis, I will be arguing that many of the problems with eco-labeling, such 
as undefined terminology, an abundance of vague claims, and greenwashing concerns, 
could be addressed by improving regulation. Before discussing regulatory issues, I will 
devote the first chapter of this thesis to defining and discussing the various types of eco-
labels, especially focusing on the tradeoffs between mandatory and voluntary labeling 
programs. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of different types of eco-labeling 
programs, I will spend the rest of my thesis discussing regulation. I will analyze the 
current regulation in the United Sates, with an emphasis on the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Green Guides. My final chapter contains recommendations for improving 
eco-labeling regulation, using examples from several well-known labeling programs as 
support.  
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Chapter 1. What Are Eco-Labels? 
 
 
Ecolabel is a fuzzy and ill-defined term that may encompass different meanings. At one 
extreme, ecolabels are “labels issued by independent organizations and displayed 
voluntarily by manufacturers who submit to inspection or in some other way meet the 
organization environmental or advertising standards.” At the other extreme, ecolabels 
are just on product claims or logos related to some extent to environmental friendliness. 
Such claims may be vague, undefined, unverified and unverifiable. 
- Ibanez and Grolleau 2008: 55, quoted Wayne 1994  
 
 
 
Eco-labels, which are sometimes referred to as green or environmental labels, are 
not easy to define. According to the EPA, “environmental labeling is defined as making 
relevant environmental information available to the appropriate consumers” (1998: 5). 
The “environmental information” is presented in a variety of formats. Some eco-labels 
are simply a word or phrase, commonly printed and circled in green, like “eco-friendly.” 
Other labels contain a picture and text, such as the Forest Stewardship Council’s eco-
label, which features a symbol that combines a checkmark and a tree above the initials 
“FSC.” Eco-labels, such as those for energy rating, contain numerical data, such as 
estimated annual energy cost or kWh used. Additionally, though rare in the United States, 
using a nutrition label format for environmental impacts is another eco-labeling 
possibility.  
 In the literature, rather than categorizing labels by format, eco-labels are generally 
discussed by other characteristics. The most basic distinction can be made between the 
systems by which eco-labels are produced, or whether the labels are the result of 
mandatory or voluntary labeling programs. Mandatory labels are legally required due to 
concerns about health, safety, or specific performance issues, such as energy or water 
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consumption of devices (Horne 2009). One of the benefits of mandatory programs is that 
they force producers to disclose information that they would be unlikely to provide 
voluntarily. For example, a company trying to sell an energy-inefficient refrigerator 
would not choose to display this information because it could make the product less 
desirable to consumers. Therefore, when it is mandated that all refrigerators have a label 
providing energy consumption information, consumers are able to compare the energy 
consumption of all refrigerators to make a more informed choice. Because mandatory 
labels force all manufacturers of a given product category to display the same 
information, a “level playing field” is created for producers (Horne 2009). Mandatory 
labels also provide the benefit of allowing consumers to easily compare specific qualities 
of all products in a given category. A final major benefit of mandatory labels is that they 
generally enjoy broad recognition and support from consumers (Horne 2009). Forcing all 
producers to disclose specific information, allowing consumers to easily compare 
products, and being broadly recognizable are all strengths of mandatory labels.  
Yet some of the strengths of mandatory labels can be seen as weakness. One 
problem with mandatory labels is that they tend to focus only on one specific aspect of 
the product, like energy consumption, rather than providing information about the overall 
environmental impacts of the product. Specific information about energy or water 
consumption could certainly benefit consumers by helping them minimize their 
electricity bill or reduce their water consumption in drought-prone areas, but it does not 
necessarily mean that the product has fewer environmental impacts overall. For instance, 
a highly energy efficient appliance could be made from a metal that releases huge 
amounts of pollution in ecologically sensitive areas when mined. If shoppers are only 
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trying to maximize energy efficiency then a mandatory energy label meets their needs; 
however, if they are trying to reduce overall environmental impacts, they could be 
making a poor decision by purchasing the energy efficient appliance.  
To provide information about all of the environmental impacts of a product, 
mandatory programs could theoretically be created that summarize a variety of 
environmental information, similar to a nutrition label on food. Information disclosure 
programs like this would be considered neutral programs because they are not making 
any value judgments or qualitative claims about the environmental attributes of the 
product (EPA 1998: xiii). Despite the fact that no value judgments are directly being 
made, “information disclosure programs are usually mandatory, since the facts disclosed 
are not always positive selling features and may not otherwise be reported by marketers” 
(EPA 1998: 13). I would expect many businesses to oppose this neutral information 
disclosure label, just as they would a negative eco-label. Past experiences implementing 
the Federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 suggest that lawsuits would be 
a likely outcome of a similar comprehensive mandatory environmental labeling act 
(Israel 1993: 326). In the next chapter I will go into greater depth about past cases of 
companies challenging labeling regulations, but to summarize my findings, the courts 
have generally sided with regulators, which suggests that business opposition alone is not 
an insurmountable obstacle for mandatory environmental labels.  
Overcoming opposition from businesses is just one problem that must be 
addressed when creating a mandatory environmental impacts label. In order to be 
effective, any information disclosure program needs information to be simplified and 
comparable across products (EPA 1998: 13). Simple and comparable information across 
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products may sound reasonably easy to provide, but in reality there are numerous 
intractable problems involved (Morris 1997). The first problem is that producers all need 
to include the same information in a common format. Deciding what information should 
be included, how that information should be measured, and how the information is 
ultimately simplified and presented to consumers, is likely to be a highly subjective 
process. There is not one right set of information to include, so when deciding the content 
of an environmental information disclosure label, there is going to be an imperfect 
attempt to balance the interests of manufacturers, consumer groups, environmental 
organizations, scientists, and many other stakeholders. The issue of balancing interests 
while deciding labeling content is raised in Morris’ book (1997: 8), “because there are no 
purely objective ways of awarding ecolabels, these programmes are subject to influence 
by various individuals and organisations.”   
Assuming all of the stakeholders could reach a compromise about what 
information should be included in the environmental label, there is not a scientific 
consensus about how environmental impacts are best measured (Morris 1997). Using a 
product life-cycle analysis1 (PLCA) to determine the environmental impacts is a possible 
solution, but there are still many issues with PLCA. As Morris (1997: 38-9) explains, 
“first, it is not clear where one should draw the boundary of the life-cycle: should it be at 
the point where the primary materials are introduced into the production process, or 
should it include the environmental costs of extracting the raw materials themselves, or, 
                                                
1 Product life-cycle analysis—taking into account all the impacts of the product on the 
environment at each stage in its life, from the use of natural resources as inputs, through 
emissions during the production, distribution and use stages, to the use of natural 
resources and/or emissions during the disposal stage. (Morris 1997: 35)  
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going one stage further back, should it include the environmental costs associated with 
producing the machinery which was used to extract the raw materials?” Creating 
boundaries for a PLCA is always going to result in guidelines that are somewhat 
arbitrary.  
Secondly, when conducting a PLCA, scientists cannot determine how consumers 
will use the product, which affects environmental impacts (Morris 1997). This problem 
can be illustrated by considering a simple case of two possible types of to-go coffee cups. 
One cup is made of polystyrene and the other of paper. Although comparing the PLCA of 
a paper and a polystyrene cup might favor the paper cup, this does not take into 
consideration that two paper cups might be required to avoid burning your fingers while 
drinking coffee (Portney 1993: 72). If a single unit of a product has fewer environmental 
impacts, but using more of the product is required to achieve a task, it becomes unclear if 
it is actually environmentally beneficial. Another problem is that distribution of the 
product, which can create significant greenhouse gas emissions, cannot be included in 
PLCA because products are shipped to various locations from various locations  (Morris 
1997). Though there are other criticisms of PLCA, these three major problems illustrate 
the challenges of measuring all of a product’s environmental impacts.  
There is also a larger question that needs to be addressed, which is would 
consumers actually use a detailed environmental impacts label to made decisions when 
shopping?  A study conducted by Lloyd (2006) found that consumers feel overloaded 
with information: 97% of those surveyed indicated that there ‘was more stuff to read than 
I could ever dream of reading’ and 92% indicated that they felt ‘surrounded’ by 
information. Though there is a temptation to believe that more information is always 
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better, more information can be overwhelming to consumers. These results suggest that 
consumers might prefer for experts to decide which products are environmentally 
superior so they only have to glance at a simple seal of approval label when shopping, 
rather than analyzing the information themselves.  
The arguments for mandatory report card environmental labels and the arguments 
for simple seals of approval are premised on vastly different views of consumers. The 
EPA (1998: 64) explains the varying consumer views underlying each type of label:  
One important difference among programs, however, is their differing 
expectations regarding the ability of labeling information to inform and 
educate consumers and to change consumer purchasing decisions. The seal 
of approval programs (ISO Type I) assume that the information needed to 
accurately describe numerous environmental attributes and LCA results is 
too complex and too extensive to present on a label. Consequently, the 
labeling organization synthesizes this information and establishes what it 
hopes to be a credible judgment of preferability (the licensing of the logo 
for qualifying products). On the other hand, report card programs (ISO 
Type III) believe that individual consumers can themselves prioritize 
across environmental burden (or stressor effect) categories (e.g., water 
consumption and air pollutants released) and that the consumer needs no 
interpretation. In that respect, the report cards (e.g., nutritional labeling) 
standardize and present environmental information. 
The fact that too much information can be overwhelming for consumers supports an 
argument for simpler eco-labels, such as seal of approval or single-attribute claims. Seal 
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of approval and single-attribute claims are the most common types of voluntary labels. 
Voluntary eco-labels are labels companies choose to place on their products that focus 
only on positive environmental information. According to the EPA, “positive labeling 
programs typically certify that labeled products possess one or more environmentally 
preferable attributes” (1998: xiii). Only focusing on positive attributes is one of the 
biggest weaknesses of voluntary eco-labels. Single-attribute claims can be especially 
misleading because they can make a product appear environmentally preferable, when in 
reality it has worse overall impacts on the environment than the average substitutable 
product. Additionally, single-attribute claims can be impossible to compare because they 
cover completely different attributes. As an example: how should a shopper decide 
between three different products labeled “recyclable,” “environmentally safe,” and 
“biodegradable?” Mandatory labels are more conducive for comparison than voluntary 
labels because they provide the same information in the same format for all products in a 
given category.  
Voluntary programs provide some key benefits, however. Rather than forcing 
manufacturers to provide information like mandatory programs, voluntary labels are 
incentive-based programs. Manufactures are encouraged to add eco-labels to their 
products “in hopes of capturing more market share and improving corporate goodwill” 
(EPA 1998: 16). The fact that manufacturers perceive voluntary eco-labeling programs to 
be beneficial is one of their biggest strengths. Another strength is that seal of approval 
labels can consider overall environmental impacts of products and provide consumers 
with recommendations, making choices easier for shoppers. It is important to remember 
that determining overall environmental impacts for seals of approval is an imperfect 
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process that faces the same product life-cycle analysis issues mentioned for information 
disclosure labels.  
Voluntary labels can be divided into independent certifications and self-
declarations. Independent certifications are provided by a third-party, while self-
declarations are claims manufacturers make about their own products. The International 
Standards Organization (ISO) classification of voluntary eco-labels, which distinguishes 
between labels by the type of certifier, is commonly used in the literature. Independent or 
third-party certified labels that provide the use of a logo, like the Marine Stewardship 
Council’s program, are called Type I labels (Horne 2009). Type II labels are based on 
self-declarations of manufacturers, importers, distributors or retailers, such as Whole 
Foods (Horne 2009).  
When discussing voluntary labels it is crucial to consider what group or 
organization is providing the certification because certifiers may be truly dedicated to 
promoting more sustainable consumption or they be motivated by profits. Type I labels 
generally have more credibility than Type II labels. Intuitively, it seems certifications 
provided by independent organizations are more likely to be objective, while self-
declarations tend to be more lax because advertisers just want to appeal to green 
consumers. A survey conducted by Lloyd (2006) shows that many consumers have the 
same intuition. Lloyd found that over two-thirds of participants distrust information from 
large companies, and similar numbers agree that corporations have no morals or ethics. 
Another survey of consumer trust in eco-labeling programs conducted in Norway, Spain, 
Germany, and Italy found that consumer or environmental organizations were ranked 
first, independent bodies were ranked second, governments were ranked third, and 
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retailers were last (Gertz 2005). It appears that consumers assume retailers are just out to 
make a profit, whereas environmental organizations are legitimately concerned about the 
environmental impacts.  
Even within the category of Type II single-attribute claims, there can be important 
differences. Single-attribute claims can either be factual, verifiable claims or general, 
unsubstantiated claims. Factual, verifiable claims would include “Made from 90% 
recycled material,” while general, unsubstantiated claims like “eco-friendly” are more 
problematic. When general self-claims are made, such as “eco-friendly,” shoppers have 
no idea what criteria, if any, were used. In an empirical study conducted by D’Souza et 
al. (2006: 162), “findings such as “satisfied with labels” correlated with “labels are 
accurate,” which suggests that businesses need to provide a clear, accurate and easily 
legible label design to encourage satisfaction with the accuracy of content and the 
communication aspects of a label.”  
Although Type I labels generally enjoy more credibility than Type II labels, 
blindly trusting Type I labels would be a mistaken approach. Certifiers of Type I labels 
can be motivated by profits too.  Many Type I labeling programs make money from each 
product they certify, therefore the more products they certify the more profits they make. 
Unfortunately, there have been cases of third-party certifiers maximizing their own 
profits by providing their seal of approval to any manufacturer who is willing to pay. 
For example, in January 2011 the Federal Trade Commission reached a settlement 
with Tested Green, a “company that allegedly sold worthless environmental certifications 
for hundreds of dollars, and falsely told more than 100 customers that its certifications 
were endorsed by two independent firms – which it actually owned” (FTC 2011). Jeremy 
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Ryan Claeys, the owner of Tested Green, is barred from making misleading 
environmental claims for the next twenty years, but is not facing any fines or jail time 
(FTC 2011). Essentially, his company profited for over a year by making false claims and 
he is walking away unpunished. While it is a good thing that Tested Green is shut down, 
the lack of serious consequences does not exactly discourage other individuals from 
scamming consumers in a similar fashion.  
The Tested Green case demonstrates the importance of transparency, another 
major eco-labeling concern. Even when consumers tried to research the Tested Green 
certification program they were provided with false endorsements from supposedly 
independent organizations, the National Green Business Association and the National 
Association of Government Contractors, which sound like legitimate organizations. 
Consumers had no way of knowing that the same man was running all three organizations 
(FTC 2011). People should be able to easily access honest information about eco-labels, 
such as information about the organization providing the labels, the criteria for the labels, 
the testing performed, and any endorsing organizations. Companies like Tested Green 
can make shoppers skeptical of all eco-labels, which can reduce the effectiveness of 
labels from legitimate organizations. Dealing with issues of trust and mistrust is at the 
heart of green labeling, so cases of particular eco-labels scamming consumers can 
undermine trust in all eco-labels (Boström and Klintmann 2008). Furthermore, 
confidence in the information conveyed through environmental labels is crucial for 
consumer willingness to consider labels in purchasing decisions (Thøgersen 2002). 
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In summary, there are major tradeoffs made when choosing between mandatory 
and voluntary labels. Mandatory eco-labeling programs require manufacturers to provide 
information, while voluntary programs allow manufacturers to choose to participate. 
Voluntary programs focus only on positive claims, while mandatory labels provide 
neutral information, such as energy consumption values, or negative labels warning 
consumers about health and safety issues. Mandatory labels are all in the same format 
and provide the same information, making them easier to compare than voluntary labels, 
which come in a wide variety of formats. Both single-attribute voluntary labels and 
mandatory labels focusing on a specific issue, such as water consumption, can be 
misleading to consumers who are concerned about overall environmental impacts. 
Finally, mandatory report card labels and voluntary seal of approval labels try to help 
consumers choose products with the least overall environment impacts, however, the 
mandatory report card labels assume consumers can interpret complex information on 
their own, while the seal of approval labels make judgments for consumers. 
Although this chapter was very critical of some of the shortcomings of eco-
labeling, it was not because I think eco-labeling has no potential as an environmental 
policy tool. I believe that it is important to identify and understand the major problems 
with eco-labeling in order to create regulations that address as many of these problems as 
possible.  
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Chapter 2: The Regulation of Eco-Labels 
 
 
 
Considering that eco-labels have been used in the United States for more than 
twenty years, there is surprisingly little regulation of their use. Initially, the federal 
government avoided creating specific laws to regulate eco-labels because agencies, such 
as the FTC, thought that existing antifraud and truth-in-advertising laws were sufficient 
regulations (Lathrop and Centner 1998). I agree with Lathrop and Centner’s analysis, 
“this approach, however, fails to regulate the field sufficiently to avoid improper claims 
and ensure that consumers receive accurate environmental information about the products 
they buy” (1998: 165). Additionally, existing laws do not adequately protect consumers 
from an abundance of vague and misleading eco-labels; “consumers still have no reliable 
definitions of environmental terms, no assurance that claims have been reviewed and 
approved, and no assurance that differing state laws have been harmonized for similar 
products sold in interstate commerce” (Lathrop and Centner 1998: 165, cites Wynne 
1991).  
More than a decade after Lathrop and Centner’s analysis, the development of 
specific standards is still incomplete. There have been proposals for national legislation 
to regulate environmental marketing claims for almost as long as there have been 
environmental claims, but legislative progress has not been made. Many interested parties 
such as manufacturers, consumer groups, environmental organizations, and attorneys 
have expressed concern over the lack of regulations, but the government appears hesitant 
to take substantive action (Israel 1993; Stevens 2010; Lathrop and Centner 1998; White 
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2010).  To provide some context, I am going to briefly explain the history of 
environmental marketing regulation in the United States. Next, I will analyze the Federal 
Trade Commission’s role in the regulation of environmental claims. Finally, I will 
discuss how the Lanham Act of 1946 has been used to regulate environmental claims, 
though it was not created for that purpose.  
 
Early Attempts at Regulation 
In March 1991, the attorneys general of New York and Minnesota worked with 
environmental and consumer groups to create the Federal Environmental Marketing 
Claims Act of 1991. This act would have established a national regulatory scheme for 
environmental marketing claims, however, after the bill was introduced to the Senate, it 
never passed (Israel 1993). In 1991, Senator Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Representative Swift 
(D-WA) each introduced new environmental marketing regulatory schemes that would 
create uniform national standards for green marketing claims (Israel 1993). Although 
there were differences between the acts, they were based on the same central tenets. Both 
acts would have involved the EPA in setting minimum national standards for 
environmental claims. Both texts also included a section on consumer education. The 
education program “would inform consumers of the types of green marketing claims 
regulated, the method of regulation, and the benefits of green consumerism” (Israel 
1993). Finally, the Lautenberg and Swift Acts each contained requirements for 
periodically reviewing and updating the EPA’s green-marketing regulations. Regularly 
updating the regulations would help ensure that the latest environmental technology was 
taken into consideration and would encourage manufacturers to use the latest technology 
to reduce the environmental impacts of their products (Israel 1993). Like the 1991 
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legislative initiative, neither the Lautenberg Act nor the Swift Act secured congressional 
sanction.  
The major disadvantage of creating new federal laws, like the Lautenberg Act or 
Swift Act is time (Israel 1993). When these acts were proposed, the challenges of passing 
the Federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 were still fresh in the minds of 
legislators and manufacturers; its passage had involved two-and-a-half years of intense 
congressional debate, as well as several lawsuits (Israel 1993: 326). Manufacturers did 
not want to have to wait for years of debates and legal battles before receiving guidelines 
about environmental claims. They thought that more immediate action was necessary to 
clear up the confusion surrounding green marketing (Israel 1993).  
 
The Federal Trade Commission  
The pressure for more immediate guidance resulted in the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) creating green marketing guidelines. The FTC seems like a strange 
choice to regulate environmental product claims, like eco-labels, especially if you think 
of them of as environmental policy tools. It appears, however, that the government and 
manufacturers viewed environmental claims primarily as advertisements, not market-
based policy tools, and regulated them as they would any other form of advertisement. 
When viewing environmental claims as advertisements, choosing the FTC to create 
regulations is a logical choice, although I will argue that regulating environmental claims 
solely as advertisements is a mistaken approach.  If environmental claims, like eco-labels, 
are going to achieve their potential as market-based policy tools then they should be 
regulated as policy tools, not just advertisements.  
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The FTC has not always been involved in regulating advertisements. Congress 
initially passed the FTC Act in 1914 to supplement the Sherman Act and the Clayton 
Antitrust Act. In 1938 the FTC Act was expanded to include the power to prevent “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices” (White 2010: 327). Although the FTC has no expertise in 
environmental issues, its power to prevent unfair methods of competition and deceptive 
acts in interstate commerce has been interpreted to include misleading advertising for the 
last seventy years (Israel 1993). The FTC did not consider environmental advertising 
until the early 1990s when issues surrounding unclear environmental claims first gained 
national attention.  
In July of 1991, during the same period when the Lautenberg Act and Swift Act 
were being proposed, the FTC hosted its first meetings to discuss environmental 
marketing. One year later, in July of 1992, the FTC released its Green Guides.2 The 
Green Guides suggest how to avoid making false or misleading environmental claims and 
provide examples of such claims. Its suggestions are only that, suggestions: the FTC 
explains in section two of the Green Guides that, “because the guides are not legislative 
rules under Section 18 of the FTC Act, they are not themselves enforceable regulations, 
nor do they have the force and effect of law” (§ 260.2). The Green Guides are supposed 
to provide general principles to help advertisers avoid making false, misleading, or 
unsubstantiated claims, but are not used for actual enforcement. In the FTC’s (2007) own 
words, the “guidance” they provide includes: “1) general principles that apply to all 
environmental marketing claims; 2) how consumers are likely to interpret particular 
claims and how marketers can substantiate these claims; and 3) how marketers can 
                                                
2 Green Guides is the common name for “Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing 
Claims”  
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qualify their claims to avoid deceiving consumers.” The language the FTC uses 
emphasizes that these guides provide advice, not strictly enforced regulations.  
In addition to being criticized by legal scholars, including Glenn Israel, Robert 
White, and Lauren Avallone, for not setting enforceable regulations, the usefulness of the 
Green Guides has been questioned because they “only offer broad definitions, general 
principles, and few examples” (Avallone 2006: 686). Unclear definitions of 
environmental terms not only lead to consumer confusion, but also can be detrimental to 
manufacturers. Unclear definitions provide loopholes for manufacturers with average 
practices and products to apply eco-labels, which prevents manufacturers with 
environmentally superior practices from successfully differentiating their products (Koos 
2011). Manufacturers may also find the unclear definitions confusing and choose not to 
make environmental claims to avoid false or misleading advertising (Avallone 2006: 
686). To the FTC’s credit, they have acknowledged many of these criticisms and are in 
the process of reviewing the Green Guides. The review process began in 2007 and, four 
years later, they are still requesting public comments about the Green Guides and 
environmental marketing claims. I was unable to find any explanation as to why it was 
taking so long to update the Green Guides, which leaves me to assume that they are not a 
top priority. While improving the Green Guides by adding more examples and 
terminology is an admirable goal, the expanded Green Guides still will not be legally 
enforceable. If the guidelines are not enforceable, then there is no guarantee that they will 
actually benefit consumers or manufacturers.  
The fact that the Green Guides are not enforceable law does not mean that the 
FTC has never charged manufacturers making false environmental claims, which it has 
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handled just like any other false marketing claims. When the FTC learns of false 
advertising claims, they are addressed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission first 
charges the manufacturer making the false claim and then settles the matter either by 
entering into an agreement with the manufacturer or by issuing a cease-and-desist order 
(Israel 1993: 311). Generally, consent agreements are reached in which manufacturers 
promise to alter their advertising to comply with the FTC's suggestions, but the 
manufacturers do not admit to any wrongdoing (Israel 1993: 312).  
The first problem with this system is that there are “no direct costs to making 
false claims so manufacturers have little incentive to be truthful” (Avallone 2006: 690). 
Manufacturers can make false environmental claims on their products and profit by 
misleading consumers without fearing any serious consequences. If manufacturers did 
face serious consequences, such as hefty fines, it would discourage making false 
environmental claims. The current guidelines, however, do not lend themselves to serious 
consequences because the definitions of environmental terms are still vague. If 
manufacturers are going to be punished, there should be clear rules and criteria for 
environmental claims, making it simple to objectively determine if a violation has 
occurred. Additionally, the FTC defines “deceptive” as "a representation, omission or 
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to 
the consumer's detriment.” Determining how a reasonable consumer would or would not 
interpret an environmental label involves some guesswork, meaning each manufacturer 
could have a very different idea of how a reasonable consumer thinks (White 2010: 327).  
Given the room for interpretation within the current guidelines, legitimate 
misunderstandings are possible. National legislation with a list of acceptable 
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environmental terminology and clear criteria needs to be created so the line between what 
is acceptable and unacceptable is well defined. Instead of having guidelines that are used 
flexibly on a case-by-case basis, regulations should be created that provide “bright line 
rules” for environmental advertisements, such as eco-labels (Avallone 2006: 686). 
Concerns have been raised that strict regulation of environmental claims could 
violate First Amendment rights. Although there have not been many cases specifically 
dealing with First Amendment rights and environmental claims, looking at rulings in 
several labeling cases suggests that environmental claims could be strictly regulated 
without violating First Amendment rights. The major legal challenges to date against 
labels involve the First Amendment implications of requiring food producers to display 
nutrition information labels on their products (Alves and Edwards 2008). Examining two 
well-known cases concerning allegations of violations of commercial free speech 
demonstrates why the courts have found that such violations did not actually occur. 
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala addressed the question of the authority of the FDA 
to limit the health claims that may be made on dietary supplements under the NLEA 
(Alves and Edwards 2008). In this case, “the plaintiff contended that: (1) the NLEA 
imposed an impermissible ban on truthful, non-misleading constitutional speech, and (2) 
that the preauthorization scheme to label the products was an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on commercial speech” (Alves and Edwards 2008: 55). In a similar case, 
Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren, the plaintiff also alleged violations of 
commercial speech when forced to comply with California state statues setting standards 
for environmental advertisements. To reach a ruling in both of these cases, the courts 
used a test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to 
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determine if the commercial speech could be subject to regulation (Alves and Edwards 
2008). According to Alves and Edwards (2008: 53) the test for determination considers 
the four following factors: 
1) Whether the speech is misleading or does not “concern lawful activity,” in 
which case no further inquiry is needed and the speech may be restricted; 
2) Whether the government’s asserted interest in regulating the speech is 
substantial; 
3) Whether the restraint directly advances the government’s interest; and 
4) Whether the legislation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the 
government’s interest.  
The courts found that in Shalala and Lungren that the speech both qualified as 
commercial and was subject to regulation based on the criteria in the above test (Alves 
and Edwards 2008). If environmental claims regulations were created, there would likely 
be cases arguing these regulations deny free speech. Therefore, when creating 
environmental claims regulations, it is crucial to make sure that the government’s interest 
in regulation is clearly explained and the regulation of environmental claims is linked to 
promoting the government’s interests in a reasonable way.  
The second major problem with the FTC’s case-by-case approach is that it is very 
time consuming.  Considering each case individually makes it impossible to regulate all 
of the manufacturers making environmental claims about hundreds of types of products 
(Avallone 2006: 691). Furthermore, looking at past cases for guidance about 
environmental claims is of limited use for manufacturers because each type of product 
has different considerations:  
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Although case-by-case prosecution gives some guidance to future green 
marketers as to what the FTC considers deceptive, it does not establish 
discernable marketing standards upon which green marketers can 
dependably rely when marketing their own environmentally friendly 
products. Green-marketing claims are unique in that each claim is made 
about a specific product with distinctive properties, and each claim is 
judged by the effect it would have on a "reasonable consumer.” (White 
2010: 327-328) 
As of January 2010, the FTC had only prosecuted thirty-seven green marketing claims 
(White 2010: 336). This relevant handful of cases is not nearly enough to cover all of the 
environmental claims a product could make, never mind all of the possible types of 
products. Furthermore, prosecuting less than forty cases in a period of nearly twenty 
years, which averages out to less than two cases annually, suggests two possibilities; (1) 
few false or misleading environmental claims are made or (2) many manufacturers are 
getting away with making false or misleading environmental claims. Evidence, 
unfortunately, points to the possibility that many manufacturers are making misleading 
claims that have yet to be regulated. In their 2009 Greenwashing Report, TerraChoice, a 
sustainability and marketing consultancy firm, found that 98% of products examined 
committed at least one of their seven sins of greenwashing.3 Additionally, almost one-
fourth of the 2,219 products studied used false labels, or labels which “through either 
words or images, give the impression of third-party endorsement where no such 
                                                
3 The seven sins include The Hidden Tradeoff, No Proof, Vagueness, Irrelevance, Lesser 
of Two Evils, Fibbing, and False Labels.  
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endorsement actually exists” (TerraChoice 2009: 9). The FTC’s case-by-case approach is 
allowing far too many false environmental claims to flood the market.  
A third problem with its incremental approach is that the FTC waits until after the 
false claims have been made before taking action, rather than preventing false claims 
from being made in the first place. Waiting until after environmental claims have already 
mislead many consumers before taking action is a bad regulatory strategy because it 
creates consumer cynicism, takes market share away from eco-labels making legitimate 
claims, and prevents the potential environmental benefits of purchasing eco-labeled 
products (TerraChoice 2009: 6). Congress should write legislation that provides clear 
definitions and national standards so individual interpretation and guesswork is removed 
from making environmental claims.  
Writing this new environmental claims legislation would be unusual because most 
environmental legislation in the United States is reactive legislation. Reactive legislation 
addresses harmful practices after they have already proven themselves to be damaging to 
human health and the environment. For example, reactive legislation might require 
mitigating pollution after it has been created using end-of-pipe technologies (Dvořáková 
and Kadlecová). On the other hand, creating policies that attempt to prevent harmful 
practices from occurring in the first place would be proactive environmental legislation. 
Encouraging people to adopt more sustainable consumption habits through information-
based policies, like eco-labels, is an example of a proactive strategy. Even within the 
realm of proactive environmental policies eco-labeling is rather unique because “in 
contrast to the majority of preventive strategies focusing on systematic examination of 
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manufacturing processes, eco-labeling makes use of market mechanisms outside the 
company which are based on supply and demand” (Dvořáková and Kadlecová).  
The largest problem that contributes to all of the other issues with the Green 
Guides is that refusing to strictly define environmental terminology has prevented the 
FTC from effectively regulating environmental claims. Applying the FTC’s “standards 
for deception, substantiation, and unfairness to green claims without first defining the 
terms used in making those green claims” is nearly impossible in cases when claims are 
not obviously egregious (Israel 1993: 328). For example, the FTC has trouble arguing 
that a manufacturer’s claim that a product is biodegradable is deceptive until the FTC 
actually defines the term biodegradable. Biodegradable could be defined as applying only 
to a product with a “proven capability to decompose in less than one year in the most 
common environment where the material is usually disposed through natural biological 
processes into nontoxic carbonaceous soil, water, or carbon dioxide” (White 2010: 338).  
Under a less strict definition, a product could be called biodegradable if it will 
"completely decompose into elements found in nature within a reasonably short period of 
time” (White 2010: 338). To apply these definitions to a common household item, like 
garbage bags, assume two different brands of garbage bags claim to be biodegradable. 
One type of bag follows the first definition and will decompose in one year in a landfill, 
while the other bag would decompose in two years with exposure to sunlight. Clearly, 
there is a significant difference between the products and both should not be allowed to 
make the same environmental claim. Without strictly defined national terminology, there 
is a large grey area that results in misleading environmental claims.  
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The FTC is unable to create national definitions, however, because the FTC has 
decided that it would be outside of its powers to set environmental policy by defining 
green marketing terms (Israel 1993: 328). Glenn Israel (1993: 328) explains the problem 
particularly well:  
The Commission's decision to promulgate environmental marketing 
guidelines without specifically defining green marketing terms, however, 
ignores the fact that poorly defined green marketing terms are a principal 
cause of misleading green marketing. Until federal legislation requires 
specific definitions for green marketing terms, the Commission's case-by-
case enforcement efforts cannot be fully effective or consistent.  
Successfully regulating environmental marketing, like eco-labels, is impossible without 
defined terminology. If the federal agency charged with regulating environmental 
marketing, the FTC, is unable to define environmental terms, then that would suggest that 
other federal and state agencies with more expertise in environmental issues should be 
involved in the process. Additionally, to function successfully as environmental policy 
tools, environmental product claims should be factually true as well as aligning with 
larger environmental policy goals. For example, having an eco-label for products 
manufactured using only renewable energy would align with the larger policy goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
The Lanham Act 
 Although the FTC is the federal agency in charge of regulating environmental 
advertising, there is another piece of federal legislation, the Lanham Act, which has been 
used to regulate environmental advertisements. The Lanham Act was passed in 1946 and 
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is best known for containing the federal statutes of trademark law. As would be expected, 
the act prohibits trademark infringement and dilution, but Subchapter III also addresses 
false and misleading statements in commercial advertising and promotion. Though the 
Lanham Act does not specifically discuss environmental claims, Section 43(a) has been 
used to challenge false environmental advertising (White 2010). Section 43(a) allows for 
limited private action against false advertising as evidenced by this quote, "any person 
who… uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device... which, in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, 
or geographic origin of... goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a 
civil action” (White 2010: 329). The definition for false advertising in the Lanham Act is 
very similar to the definition of deceptive that the FTC employs. White (2010) argues 
that the Lanham Act and section 5 of the FTC Act function similarly by containing broad 
definitions of deception and misrepresentation that allow advertisers to be prosecuted. 
There are major differences between the Acts, such as under the Lanham Act litigants do 
not have an equivalent of the Green Guides to help them determine if an advertisement is 
deceptive. Another key difference is that the FTC Act is only enforceable by the FTC, 
whereas private groups can use the Lanham Act (White 2010).  
Yet, in general, consumers’ attempts to use the Lanham Act have been 
unsuccessful, despite the fact that the act gives standing in Section 43(a) to "any person 
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by false advertising (White 
2010: 330). Many judges have denied standing to consumers under the act and “hold that 
the section was enacted to provide relief to competitive or commercial interests, and not 
consumer interests” (White 2010: 330). It seems problematic that consumers, who are the 
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ones being deceived by false environmental claims, have no national legislation 
empowering them to protect their own interests. An ideal national regulation of 
environmental claims would give consumers and consumer groups the power to sue 
companies that have been profiting by misleading them.  
Though this act provides little help to consumers frustrated by deceptive 
environmental claims, some businesses have used it successfully to sue their competitors 
for making false environmental claims. The Lanham Act was not created with 
environmental advertising in mind, but it is nonetheless noteworthy because it has been 
used by businesses to challenge their competitors green claims. Incorporating businesses 
into the regulation of eco-labeling is a wise decision because they have financial 
incentives to monitor their competition and bring claims against greenwashing behaviors 
(White 2010). Instead of expecting the government to take sole responsibility for 
monitoring the thousands of environmental claims made each year, it would be more 
effective to create provisions in national regulations that allow manufacturers to monitor 
and challenge their competitors’ environmental claims.  
One potential problem with this provision is that larger companies could use it to 
shut down the environmental claims of their smaller competitors by threatening a lawsuit. 
The threat of lawsuits could then decrease the ability of small green companies to make 
environmental claims about their products because they have fewer resources to devote to 
legal battles. However, I believe this problem could be avoided by keeping it in mind 
when writing the lawsuit provision. Furthermore, if the small company is making an 
accurate claim, they should have nothing to worry about. The provision would only allow 
lawsuits in cases when companies cannot substantiate their environmental claims. If 
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smaller companies are threatened with a lawsuit, they can submit evidence substantiating 
their environmental claims to the court, proving that their competitor has no basis for a 
case.  
If Congress creates national legislation regulating environmental claims, it should 
include a section specifically allowing manufacturers to challenge their competitors’ 
environmental claims. The Lanham Act provides a general framework in Section 43(a) 
that could be built upon and adapted in new environmental legislation to specifically 
facilitate manufacturers challenging misleading environmental claims of their 
competitors.  
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Chapter 3: Regulatory Recommendations 
 
 
 My analysis of the current regulation of eco-labels has shown that there are 
numerous regulatory issues that need to be addressed. The general guidelines provided by 
the FTC’s Green Guides are not sufficient to regulate the hundreds of different eco-labels 
on the market. We need enforceable national environmental marketing regulations to 
ensure that consumers are receiving accurate information. Congress should immediately 
begin working on this new legislation. National legislation regulating environment claims 
should be created that includes involvement of key stakeholders, a list of acceptable 
environmental claims, enforceable national definitions of environmental terms, an avenue 
for manufacturers and consumers to challenge environmental claims, consumer 
education, and periodic review and revision. In this chapter, I will discuss each of these 
components in detail.  
 
1. Involvement of Key Stakeholders  
Congress should create national environmental claims legislation with the help of 
a panel composed of representatives from relevant federal agencies and the major 
stakeholder groups. I believe that using a panel, opposed to one federal agency, is the best 
option because using a panel for the regulation of eco-labeling has been successful in 
other countries. For example, Germany’s national Blue Angel program uses a panel with 
a variety of stakeholders to award their eco-label. The Blue Angel program is arguably 
one of the most successful eco-labeling programs in the world, and was recognized by 
80% of German households just ten years after its initial implementation (Salzman 1991). 
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While there are significant cultural differences between Germany and the United States, I 
still believe that a stakeholder model is the best way to approach this national 
environmental regulation. Although stakeholder models are more commonly used for 
regulation in Germany than in the United States, regulating eco-labels is such a complex 
task that there is no single agency or group that has enough expertise in enough issues to 
successfully regulate environmental claims alone. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
industry in the U.S. generally tends to undermine or avoid regulations, rather than 
collaborate on the creation of new regulations, I think it is important for manufacturers 
have input into the creation of national environmental claims regulations. However, even 
assuming the worst-case scenario, in which the manufacturing representative does 
nothing but attempt to undermine the new regulations, his or her vote would just be one 
of many on the panel.  
Having a panel composed of different stakeholders will provide a variety of 
perspectives on key issues, allow lessons from previous regulatory legislation to be 
applied to environmental claims, and ensure that eco-labels are user-friendly for both 
consumers and manufacturers. I believe the panel should include, at a minimum, 
representatives from the major stakeholders in this process including the FTC, the FDA, 
the EPA, consumer groups, and manufacturers (Avallone 2006). Each of these 
stakeholders can make a unique and crucial contribution to the creation of national 
legislation regulating environmental claims.  
The FTC should continue being involved with the regulation of environmental 
claims because of its years of experience regulating advertisements and experience with 
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the Green Guides. The FTC could apply the feedback and criticisms received about the 
Green Guides to avoid repeating its shortcomings in national legislation.  
The second federal agency that should be involved is the FDA. The FDA would 
provide valuable insights to the panel for several reasons. The first reason is that the FDA 
is in charge of food labels, which is one of the major categories of eco-labeled products. 
The FDA’s expertise in food issues means that it should be involved in defining eco-
labeling terms used on food and beverages. Secondly, the FDA was involved with the 
creation of nutrition labels (Avallone 2006). Lessons learned during the process of 
creating and implementing nutrition labels could be applied to improving the regulation 
of eco-labels.  
The final federal agency I believe should be involved with creating new 
environmental claims regulations is the EPA. The EPA has the most environmental 
expertise of any government agency, and therefore should play a key role in defining 
environmental terminology (Lathrop and Centner 1998). Through its Consumer Labeling 
Initiative (CLI), the EPA has worked with industry to try to improve consumer 
comprehension of labels on household cleaners, indoor insecticides, and outdoor 
pesticides (EPA 1998). The general principles the EPA learned about increasing 
consumer comprehension of labels during CLI could be applied to increasing consumer 
comprehension of eco-labels. The EPA also has the power to set environmental policy 
and would be instrumental in regulating eco-labels as environmental policy tools, not just 
advertisements. The EPA involvement could help connect eco-labels to broader U.S. 
environmental policy goals.  
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The EPA has successfully connected eco-labels to environmental policy goals 
through its Energy Star label. Energy Star was introduced in 1992 as a voluntary labeling 
program designed to further the environmental policy goal of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by promoting energy-efficient products (Brown et al. 2002). The Energy Star 
program has expanded significantly since its initial creation and partnered with the U.S. 
Department of Energy to cover nearly the entire buildings sector, spanning new homes, 
commercial buildings, residential heating and cooling equipment, major appliances, 
office equipment, commercial and residential lighting, and home electronics (Brown et al. 
2002). Unlike many eco-labels, which just suggest potential environmental benefits, there 
have been some studies conducted that suggest Energy Star actually has reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions. One study found that from 1993 to 2000, when Energy Star-
labeled computers, monitors and printers were available, the program saved an estimated 
1.5 exajoules (exaJ), resulting in an energy bill savings of $10 billion and carbon 
emissions reduction of 26 million metric tons (Brown et al. 2002: 514). Another strength 
of the Energy Star program is its broad consumer recognition, even in a market flooded 
with hundreds of different eco-labels. In 2008, Energy Star enjoyed a consumer 
recognition rate of nearly 75% of the U.S. population (Murray and Mills 2011).  
Despite the fact that the Energy Star program has the strengths of high consumer 
recognition and acts as an advertisement of the energy efficiency of the product while 
promoting larger environmental policy goals, the program does has one major weakness; 
a vulnerability to fraud. In March of 2010, articles ran about the shocking results of a 
Government Accountability Office audit of the Energy Star program in publications such 
as The New York Times and Popular Mechanics. During the audit, more than a dozen 
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fake products from fake companies received approval, including a gasoline-powered 
alarm clock (Wald 2010). Congressional auditors said that they were told by Energy Star 
officials “that some of the approvals, including the one for the gasoline alarm clock, had 
been issued by an automated system and that the details had probably never been 
reviewed by a human being” (Wald 2010).  
The EPA’s Energy Star label is an example of a good idea suffering from poor 
regulation. The lack of live human beings actually reviewing environmental claims at 
federal agencies, like the EPA, makes the consumer and manufacturer lawsuit provision I 
recommend even more important. Relying on the government alone to catch false claims 
does not appear to be a realistic option. The EPA’s successes and failures with the Energy 
Star program provide important lessons that should be considered by the panel when 
creating new environmental claims regulations.  
In addition to the three federal agencies mentioned, it is important to have at least 
one representative from a consumer group, such as Consumer Reports, on the panel. In 
the literature I was surprised by the lack of discussion of the importance of consumer 
involvement in improving eco-labels. At the most basic level, eco-labels are meant to 
convey information about the environmental impacts of products to consumers. In my 
opinion, if the majority of consumers cannot understand eco-labels, then they are failing 
as a policy tool. Having a panel member focused specifically on making sure the 
regulations create eco-labels that are clear, accessible, and transparent for consumers is 
crucial for the creation of effective environmental claims regulations (D’Souza 2006). 
Finally, the panel should include at least one manufacturing representative. This 
seems like an obvious point, but eco-labels need to be used to be effective. Eco-labels 
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should be based on criteria that are economically feasible for manufacturers to meet. 
Although setting criteria that would require manufacturers to improve their practices or 
upgrade to greener technologies might be reasonable in many cases, it is also possible 
that criteria could be set unreasonably high. If manufacturers would have to make 
massive investments to meet new eco-labeling criteria they might be unwilling or unable 
to tolerate such a financial burden. Having at least one representative of manufacturers on 
the panel will help create legislation that balances out promoting environmental 
objectives with economic realities.  
 
2. A List of Acceptable Environmental Claims  
 One of the major problems with eco-labeling regulation stems from the fact that 
there are so many environmental terms used on eco-labels that it is difficult to even make 
a comprehensive list of them, never mind actually attempting to define all of the terms. 
Essentially, having more terms creates more confusion. Therefore, I would recommend 
creating a list of acceptable environmental terms to use on eco-labels. Twenty well-
defined terms will be more useful to consumers than being overwhelmed by hundreds of 
slightly different claims. Additionally, explicitly stating which terms are acceptable for 
eco-labels will prevent advertisers from making up new terms by slapping prefixes like 
“eco” onto words whenever they feel like it. I would recommend vague, blanket terms 
like “Eco-Friendly,” “Earth-Friendly,” “Eco-Safe,” and “Earth Smart” not be included on 
this list because they are difficult to substantiate and likely to mislead consumers. These 
blanket terms are suggestive of environmental benefits, without actually providing any 
useful information. Furthermore, many of these terms imply that these products are 
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actually beneficial for the environment in some way, when in reality, these products have 
fewer environmental impacts than the average product, assuming their claims of 
environmental friendliness are even substantiated. The list of acceptable terms should 
instead include claims that can be substantiated like “Recyclable,” “Biodegradable,” and 
“Made with Renewable Energy.”  
 
3. Enforceable National Definitions of Environmental Terminology  
 Once the list of acceptable environmental claims has been established, these 
environmental terms should be strictly defined. Creating a checklist of minimum criteria 
that products must meet to use each environmental claim would take the guesswork out 
of interpreting environmental claims. For example, to use the term “biodegradable” the 
panel would specify a maximum timeframe to be considered biodegradable, the 
environment the product degrades in, and the elements that the product biodegrades into. 
Consumers would then know that all products making a given environmental claim, such 
as biodegradable, are using the same definition, rather than having to wonder if each 
manufacturer is using different criteria. A strict definition with specific criteria would 
also make distinguishing between accurate and false environmental claims an easy 
process; products that do not meet the national minimum criteria for a given 
environmental claim cannot use that environmental claim. In addition to making labels 
easier for consumers to compare, these national definitions would make charging 
manufacturers for false environmental claims a more straightforward process.  
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4. An Avenue for Manufacturers and Consumers to Challenge Environmental Claims 
 Consumers should be able to demand evidence supporting environmental claims 
on products they purchase, just as manufacturers should be able to demand proof from 
their competitors that a product using an eco-label meets the national criteria. If the 
manufacturer in question cannot provide that proof, then the consumer or manufacturer 
questioning their claims should be able to take them to court to sue for damages. 
Including a legal avenue for consumers to protect their interest in not being deceived and 
manufacturers to protect their interest in not losing business to competitors making false 
claims would promote compliance with the new regulations. The small number of cases 
the FTC has brought against false environmental claims shows that government agencies 
do not have the time or the resources to devote to challenging and verifying every single 
case of environmental claims. Allowing consumers and manufacturers to challenge 
environmental claims would reduce the regulatory burden on the government. Another 
potential benefit of allowing manufacturers and consumers to challenge false 
environmental claims is that fear of a legal battle would discourage manufacturers from 
making claims they cannot substantiate.  
 
5. Consumer Education  
In order to be successful, eco-labels not only need to make accurate 
environmental claims, but also need consumers to care about environmental issues. In the 
EPA’s 1998 report Environmental Labeling Issues, Policies, and Practices Worldwide, 
they conclude, “one of the primary limitations in environmental labeling programs to date 
has been a lack of awareness on the part of consumers. Increased consumer awareness 
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about environmental issues and the existence and purpose of environmental labeling 
could significantly affect the success of programs” (67). National legislation for 
environmental claims should include a section on consumer education. If consumers are 
unaware of the environmental issues associated with consumption, they are unlikely to 
give eco-labels much consideration, even if the labels are clear and accurate. Ideally, this 
consumer education would teach consumers about the environmental impacts of 
consumption, educate consumers about environmental terminology, and connect eco-
labeling with the larger environmental problems it is attempting to address. 
 
6. Periodic Review and Revision  
 To be successful in the long term, the regulation of environmental claims needs to 
be periodically reviewed and updated. Although federal regulatory approaches are not 
exactly known for their ability to quickly adjust with the times, the Nutrition Labeling 
and Education Act (NLEA) of 1990 included a provision that that the guidelines be re-
examination every five years “to ensure that they reflect the current knowledge and 
values in the American diet” (Alves and Edwards 2008). The NLEA guidelines have been 
successfully updated and altered to include new values, such as transfats, which suggests 
that national regulations of environmental claims could also be updated regularly (Alves 
and Edwards 2008).  
One reason frequent updates are necessary is because of technological advances. 
Technological advancements can make previously impossible goals possible and older 
technologies generally decrease in price over time. Due to technological changes, it is 
important to continually re-evaluate the minimum criteria a product must meet to qualify 
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for an eco-label. Environmental standards should be gradually tightened over time to 
ensure manufacturers continue improving their practices.  
 Another reason regular updates are necessary is because new environmental 
terminology is introduced all of the time, which means new terms may need to be added 
to the regulation or old terms may become obsolete. There should be time for public 
comment and input from relevant stakeholders during these review and revision 
processes. Regularly reviewing and updating regulation allows for learning from past 
mistakes, addressing new problems as they emerge, and adjusting regulations to meet 
currents needs.  
 
Regulatory Conclusions 
 Creating national legislation specifically regulating environmental claims would 
address many of the current problems with eco-labeling and other methods of 
environmental advertising. The process of creating this national legislation should 
include input from a panel of key stakeholders, instead of being created by just one 
government agency. One of the first tasks of this panel should be to limit the number of 
environmental claims manufacturers can make about their products and strictly define 
those environmental terms. If all products using the same term are also using the same 
definition it will make it easier for consumers to compare products. Additionally, 
consumers or business competitors that are skeptical about a manufacturer’s 
environmental claims should be able to ask for proof that the product bearing the eco-
label actually meets national standards. When manufacturers are found to be making 
unsubstantiated claims, consumers and other manufacturers should be able to take them 
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to court to demand the false label be removed and potentially recover damages for this 
false advertising. Another key component of successful environmental claims legislation 
would be consumer education about environmental issues, environmental terminology, 
and the potential of eco-labeled products to contribute to addressing environmental 
problems. Finally, the legislation of environmental claims should be reviewed and 
updated periodically to ensure the legislation is keeping up with technological 
advancements and gradually increasing environmental standards.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
Conclusions 
 Eco-labeling was initially created to promote more sustainable consumption by 
encouraging consumers to consider the environmental impacts of consumption and by 
encouraging producers to improve their environmental practices. Furthermore, eco-labels 
were intended to provide consumers with information about the relative environmental 
impacts of products, something impossible to determine just by looking at a final product. 
The practical realities of actually implementing eco-labeling have proven to be far from 
simple. Unfortunately, eco-labeling has become incredibly complicated and confusing for 
everyone involved.  
Like any policy tool, eco-labeling is imperfect. Despite the many faults discussed 
in this thesis, I still believe that eco-labeling is a valuable policy idea that has suffered as 
a result of poor regulation in the United States. Inadequate regulation has resulted in the 
creation of hundreds of eco-labels making different claims, using varying definitions of 
terminology, and displaying a plethora of stereotypically environmental symbols. 
Furthermore, consumers have trouble distinguishing between labels that are certified by a 
legitimate third party, labels that are certified by third parties out to make a quick profit, 
and claims manufacturers place on their own products.  
Improving regulations to increase the clarity and transparency of labels should be 
a top priority. Creating a national list of acceptable environmental product claims and 
strictly defining those environmental terms will help alleviate much of the confusion 
surrounding eco-labels. My analysis suggests that many of the problems with eco-
labeling have developed because eco-labeling is regulated like any other advertisement, 
rather than as an environmental policy tool. If we want eco-labels to act as a policy tool 
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that contributes to more sustainable consumption, we should regulate eco-labels as a 
policy tool. Eco-labels should be connected to larger environmental policy goals, to 
ensure that eco-labels are more than just some marketing scheme. Despite its faults, 
programs like the EPA’s Energy Star prove that eco-labels can enjoy broad consumer 
recognition while still connecting to larger environmental goals.  
It is also crucial that eco-labeling is combined with consumer education about the 
environmental issues associated with consumption. Americans need to understand 
environmental issues to fully appreciate the importance of reducing the environmental 
impacts of their consumption. Additionally, if new national regulations are created, 
consumers should be informed about how environmental terminology is defined and how 
eco-labels are regulated. It appears there already is some consumer demand for more 
information about eco-labeling, especially considering Consumer Reports just released an 
Eco-Label iPhone App so shoppers can research unfamiliar labels from the store.  
 Finally, it is important that we maintain realistic expectations about what eco-
labeling can and cannot achieve. It would be far too much to expect eco-labeling to solve 
all of the complex environmental problems associated with consumption. However, if 
regulated properly, eco-labeling can be used in conjunction with other policy tools to 
address the many challenging environmental problems we currently face.  
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